Games with Graph Restricted Communication and Levels Structure of Cooperation by Tejada, Oriol & Álvarez-Mozos, Mikel
 Col.lecció d’Economia E17/363  
 
Games with Graph Restricted 
Communication and Levels Structure of 
Cooperation 
 
 
 
 
Oriol Tejada  
Mikel Álvarez-Mozos   
 
UB Economics Working Papers 2017/363 
 
 
 
 
 
Games with Graph Restricted Communication 
and Levels Structure of Cooperation  
 
 
Abstract: We analyze surplus allocation problems where cooperation between agents 
is restricted both by a communication graph and by a sequence of embedded partitions 
of the agent set. For this type of problem, we define and characterize two new values 
extending the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value respectively. Our results enable 
the axiomatic comparison between the two values and provide some basic insights for 
the analysis of fair resource allocation in nowadays fully integrated societies.. 
 
 
 
 
JEL Codes:  C7. 
 
 
Keywords: Coalitional games, Restricted cooperation, Graph restricted 
communication, Levels structure, Shapley value, Banzhaf value.  
 
 
Oriol Tejada   
ETH-Zurich 
 
Mikel Álvarez-Mozos  
Universitat de Barcelona 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements: This research received financial support from Ministerio de 
Economía y Competitividad through projects MTM2014-53395-C3-2-P and ECO2014-
52340-P as well as from Generalitat de Catalunya through project 2014-SGR-40. 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 1136-8365 
1 Introduction
As a general rule, the layout of political administrations consist of a series of embedded
layers. For instance, the EU is integrated by countries, which are organized in regions,
which in turn are divided into smaller administrative units, say cities, and so on. As
far as his/her relation with political institutions (and hence with political power) is
concerned, a EU citizen can typically deal with one and only one institution at each
level. The overall political and administrative layout typically affects the possibilities
of citizens to cooperate, which would be free of administrative hurdles if no political
institution existed. For example, it is generally easier to engage in a business venture
within a common labor market with a single set of rules than within several markets,
each regulated by a different set of rules.1
The fact that citizens are integrated in a sequence of embedded layers does not
prevent them from interacting in various other ways, some of which go beyond the
lines set up by political institutions. For instance, there is a great flow of workers
between the major financial markets even though they do not belong to a common
political entity. This is possible due to the existence of certain networks, very especially
transportation networks and communication networks. More generally, trade between
individuals and firms does not necessarily obey political structures, specially after the
outset of globalization. Rivers, highways, train networks, among others, are facilitators
of business and enable the possibility for different groups of individuals or firms to
reach their full potential. Production chains of some major corporations in particular
are now dispersed in many different countries thanks to the existence of many global
networks. With such non-political linkages boosting economic growth, most of the
redistribution policies (say, taxes and public expenditures) are however decided only by
political institutions operating mostly at the national or regional level.
In a framework where production is not only intertwined with political institutions
1The so-called border effect is a well-documented phenomenon in international trade (see e.g. Evans,
2003).
3
but also with a host of other (binary) linkages such as social networks, is there a
reasonable way to address the issue of how should the aggregate spoils generated by all
citizens be shared among them? Gaining knowledge about solutions to this problem is
the general object of this paper. Taking here mainly a normative approach, we focus
in particular on certain properties that may be required for surplus allocation rules. In
this vein, it is worth noting that the increase in inequality (see e.g. Atkinson, 2015) that
has occurred in the latter years in many countries has raised some concerns with regard
to the possibility that policy decisions should be adopted, which would guarantee that
all citizens benefit from globalization. Our analysis features some elements of fairness
that revolve around such concerns.
To elaborate, we analyze the class of surplus allocation problems where cooperation
between agents (say, citizens) is restricted both by a sequence of embedded partitions
of the agent set and by a communication graph between agents. Formally, we consider
a triple made up of a TU-game, a levels structure, and a non-directed graph, which we
call a Game with Graph Restricted Communication and Levels Structure of Coopera-
tion. First, the TU-game describes the potential gains that any subset of players can
attain on their own assuming that cooperation were unrestricted. Second, the sequence
of embedded partitions of the player set (the so-called levels structure) represents the
different “administrative units” in which players are organized. These given arrange-
ments among agents restrict or hinder the formation of coalitions where some of its
members belong to different units at some levels. Third and last, the communication
graph accounts for the bilateral relations that may exist between players, e.g. due to
commercial relations. We assume that a coalition of agents can cooperate only if all
of its members are path connected within the graph. Such links extend naturally to
higher units: A city is connected with another city if there is a link between citizens of
both cities. Likewise the levels structure, a communication graph affects cooperation
between all players, whether directly or indirectly.
Games with graph restricted communication and levels structure of cooperation
provide an appropriate model to address the normative problem of how to allocate the
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surplus that all the agents can potentially create in light of the restrictions placed by
all layers of political institutions and all communication networks. To make progress
in this direction, we introduce two values (or point-valued solutions) for games with
graph restricted communication and levels structure of cooperation. The first value fo-
cuses on the orderings in which coalitions are formed, while the second value considers
coalitions directly, without any reference as to how they are formed. As is standard in
the literature, the first one extends the Shapley value and the second one extends the
Banzahf value, the two classic solutions for TU-games. We then provide a character-
ization of each value by means of several properties (or axioms). Such properties are
of two types. A first type describes particular ways how the surplus sharing should be
affected by alterations of the communication graph. A second set of properties deals
with changes in the levels structure. Importantly, the latter properties used in either
characterization result are (logically) comparable. This fact may be useful when facing
the problem of whether to use a value or another for a given particular situation.2
Our contribution belongs to the extensive literature of games with restricted coop-
eration, which dates back at least to Aumann and Drèze (1974) (see also Owen, 1977;
Myerson, 1977). While the former considers TU-games where cooperation is restricted
by a partition of the player set (the so-called games with coalition structure), the lat-
ter consider TU-games where cooperation is restricted by a communication graph (the
so-called games with graph restricted communication). Several papers have built on
or extended these models (see e.g. Owen, 1986; Amer et al., 2002; Alonso-Meijide and
Fiestras-Janeiro, 2002, 2006). Singularly, Winter (1989) generalized the model of games
with coalition structure to account for the fact that restrictions to cooperation may ex-
ist at various levels. He refers to his extended framework as games with levels structure
(of cooperation). Both type of restrictions to cooperation, i.e. levels structures and
undirected graphs, can however exist simultaneously. To account for this possibility,
Vázquez-Brage et al. (1996) and Alonso-Meijide et al. (2009) have already proposed
and characterized generalizations of the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value for games
2We elaborate more on this issue in Section 4.
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with both a coalition structure and a communication graph. The model we analyze
here is a natural generalization of the latter, insofar as it considers a levels structure
instead of coalition structure (i.e, a levels structure with a single level).
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we set the notation and introduce
the main concepts from the literature. In Section 3 we define two new values for
games with graph restricted communication and levels structure of cooperation, which
we characterize by means of a number of properties and then compare. Section 4
concludes. The proofs are all contained in the Appendix.
2 Notations and Preliminaries
2.1 TU-games
Let Ω denote the (possibly infinite) set of potential players. A cooperative game with
transferable utility (TU-game) is a pair (N, v), where ∅ 6= N ⊆ Ω is a finite set of players
and v : 2N = {S : S ⊆ N} → R is the characteristic function, with v(∅) = 0. For every
coalition S ⊆ N , v(S) represents the worth of coalition S, i.e., the total payoff that
members of the coalition can obtain by agreeing to cooperate. We denote the collection
of all TU-games by G. For the sake of readability, we henceforth abuse notation slightly
and write T ∪i and T \i instead of T ∪{i} and T \{i} for T ⊆ N and i ∈ N , respectively.
We use the | · | operator to denote the cardinality of a finite set.
A value on G is a map, f, that assigns a unique vector f(N, v) ∈ RN to every
(N, v) ∈ G. A permutation of N is a bijective map pi : N → N . Let Π(N) denote the
set of permutations of N . Given pi ∈ Π(N) and i ∈ N , let pi−1[i] indicate the set of
players ordered before i in permutation pi, i.e., pi−1[i] = {j ∈ N : pi(j) < pi(i)}. Next,
we present the formal definitions of two well-known values on G, namely the Shapley
and Banzhaf values.
Definition 2.1. The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953), Sh, is the value on G defined for
6
every (N, v) ∈ G and i ∈ N by
Shi(N, v) =
1
|Π(N)|
∑
pi∈Π(N)
[
v
(
pi−1[i] ∪ i)− v (pi−1[i])] .
The Banzhaf value (Banzhaf, 1965), Ba, is the value on G defined for every (N, v) ∈ G
and i ∈ N by
Bai(N, v) =
1
2|N |−1
∑
S⊆N\i
[v(S ∪ i)− v(S)] .
The differences between the two above values are well know from an axiomatic
viewpoint (see e.g. Young, 1985; Feltkamp, 1995; Nowak, 1997).
2.2 Games with graph restricted communication
A communication graph is an undirected graph without loops defined on a finite set of
nodes. That is, (N,C) is a communication graph if N is a finite set of nodes and C
is a set of links among the nodes. A link between i and j is denoted by {i : j} (note
that {i : j} = {j : i}). Given i, j ∈ S ⊆ N , we say that i and j are connected in S
by C if there is a path in S connecting them, i.e., for some k ≥ 0, there is a subset
{i0, . . . , ik} ⊆ S such that i0 = i, ik = j, and for every l ∈ {1, . . . k}, {il−1 : il} ∈ C. By
S/C we denote the partition of S into maximal connected components. The complete
graph on a finite set N is denoted by (N,CN), i.e., CN = {{i : j} : i, j ∈ N, i 6= j}.
The set of all communication graphs is denoted by C. Given a communication graph
(N,C) ∈ C, a node i ∈ N is said to be isolated in the graph if there is no link from her,
i.e., for every j ∈ N\i, {i : j} /∈ C. The communication graph (N,C−i) is obtained from
(N,C) by dissolving the links where i is involved, i.e., C−i = {{k : l} ∈ C : k, l ∈ N \i}.
Similarly, given a link {i : j}, the communication graph (N,C−ij) is obtained from
(N,C) by eliminating the link {i : j}, i.e., C−ij = {{k : l} ∈ C : {k : l} 6= {i : j}}.
A game with graph restricted communication is a triple (N, v, C) where (N, v) ∈ G
and (N,C) ∈ C. The set of all games with graph restricted communication is denoted
by GC. A value on GC is a map, f, that assigns a unique vector f(N, v) ∈ RN to every
(N, v, C) ∈ GC.
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For every (N, v, C) ∈ GC, the graph restricted game (N, vC) ∈ G assumes that players
can only communicate through (N,C). In other words, a coalition can cooperate only
if it is connected through the communication graph. Formally, for every S ⊆ N ,
vC(S) =
∑
T∈S/C
v(T ).
Two well-known values on GC that generalize the Shapley and Banzhaf values are
presented below.
Definition 2.2. The Myerson value (Myerson, 1977), SG, is the value on GC defined
for every (N, v, C) ∈ GC by
SG(N, v, C) = Sh
(
N, vC
)
.
The Banzhaf graph value (Owen, 1986), BG, is the value on GC defined for every
(N, v, C) ∈ GC by
BG(N, v, C) = Ba
(
N, vC
)
.
2.3 Games with levels structure of cooperation
Consider now that the cooperation among agents is restricted by means of a finite
sequence of partitions defined on the player set, each of them being coarser than the
previous one. Formally, Winter (1989) introduced a levels structure of cooperation (or
simply a levels structure) being a pair (N,B) where N ⊆ Ω is a finite set of players and
B is a sequence of partitions of N , B = {B0, . . . , Bk+1}, with the following properties:
B0 = {{i} : i ∈ N}, Bk+1 = {N}, and, for each r ∈ {0, . . . , k}, Br+1 is coarser
than Br. That is to say, for each r ∈ {1, . . . , k + 1} and each S ∈ Br, there is
B ⊆ Br−1 such that S = ∪U∈B U . Each S ∈ Br is called a union and Br is called
the rth level of B. The levels B0 and Bk+1 are added for notational convenience. We
denote by
(
N,B0
)
the trivial levels structure with k = 0, i.e., B0 = {B0, B1} where
B0 = {{i}}i∈N and B1 = {N}. We further denote by L the set of all levels structures.
Let (N,B) ∈ L with B = {B0, . . . , Bk+1} and i ∈ N . Then, (N,B−i) ∈ L(N) is the
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levels structure obtained from (N,B) by isolating player i from the union she belongs
to at each level, i.e., B−i = {B0, B−i1 , . . . , B−ik , Bk+1}, where, for all r ∈ {1, . . . , k},
B−ir = {U ∈ Br : i /∈ U} ∪ {S \ i, {i}} with i ∈ S ∈ Br.
A game with levels structure of cooperation is a triple (N, v,B), where (N, v) ∈ G and
(N,B) ∈ L. We denote by GL the set of all games with levels structure of cooperation.
Let (N, v,B) ∈ GL with B = {B0, . . . , Bk+1}, for each r ∈ {0, . . . , k} we define the
rth level union game (Br, vr, Br) ∈ GL induced from (N, v,B) as the game with levels
structure of cooperation with the elements of Br as players, characteristic function
vr given by vr(S) = v(
⋃
U∈S U) for any coalition S ⊆ Br, and with levels structure
Br = {Br0, . . . , Brk−r+1} given by Br0 = {{U} : U ∈ Br}, Brs = {{U ∈ Br : U ⊆ U ′} :
U ′ ∈ Br+s} for s ∈ {1, . . . , k − r}, and Brk−r+1 = {{U : U ∈ Bk}}. Note that Br = B if
r = 0, whereas Bk is the trivial levels structure B0 on the player set {U : U ∈ Bk}.
A value on GL is a map, f, that assigns to every game with levels structure of
cooperation (N, v,B) ∈ GL a vector f(N, v,B) ∈ RN . To present two values on GL,
we need to introduce some further notation. On the one hand, for every (N,B) ∈ L
with B = {B0, . . . , Bk+1}, the set of permutations of N that respect the levels structure
(N,B) is denoted by Ω(B) and is defined by
Ω(B) = {pi ∈ Π(N) : ∀Br ∈ B,∀T ∈ Br,∀i, j ∈ T,
and k ∈ N, if pi(i) < pi(k) < pi(j) then k ∈ T} .
On the other hand, for every (N,B) ∈ L and i ∈ N , let i ∈ U0 = {i} ⊆ U1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ Uk
such that Ur ∈ Br for all r ∈ {0, . . . , k}. Then, the partition induced by B on i is
defined as
P (i, B) =
k⋃
r=0
(Br)|Ur+1\Ur ,
where Uk+1 = N by convenience. Then, P (i, B) ∈ P(N \ i). We denote |P (i, B)| by mi,
and the unions of the partition induced by B on i, by P (i, B) = {T1, . . . , Tmi}. Finally,
the set of indices of the partition induced by B on i is denoted by Mi = {1, . . . ,mi}
and for every R ⊆Mi, TR = ∪r∈RTr.
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Definition 2.3. The Shapley levels value (Winter, 1989), ShL, is the value on GL
defined for every (N, v,B) ∈ GC and i ∈ N by
ShLi (N, v,B) =
1
|Ω(B)|
∑
σ∈Ω(B)
[
v
(
σ−1[i] ∪ i)− v (σ−1[i])] .
The Banzhaf Levels value (Álvarez-Mozos and Tejada, 2011), BaL, is the value on GL
defined for every (N, v, C) ∈ GC and i ∈ N by
BaLi (N, v,B) =
∑
R⊆Mi
1
2mi
[v(TR ∪ i)− v(TR)] .
The two values above yield the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value, respectively
if the levels structure is trivial. They also generalize the Owen value (Owen, 1977) and
the Banzhaf-Owen value (Owen, 1982).3
3 Two New Solutions
Finally, we are in a position to introduce the main mathematical objects we are dealing
with in this paper. A game with graph restricted communication and levels structure of
cooperation is a four-tuple (N, v, C,B) ∈ GCL where N ⊆ Ω, (N, v) ∈ G, (N,C) ∈ C
and (N,B) ∈ L. We let GCL denote the set of all such games. A value on GCL is then
a map, f, that assigns to every game with graph restricted communication and levels
structure of cooperation (N, v, C,B) ∈ GCL a vector f(N, v, C,B) ∈ RN .
In this section we do three things. First, we introduce and characterize a new
value for games with graph restricted communication and levels structure of cooper-
ation, which generalizes the Shapley value. Second, we introduce and characterize
another new value for games with graph restricted communication and levels struc-
ture of cooperation, which generalizes the Banzhaf value. Third, we build on the two
characterizations to compare the two proposed values.
3These values are defined in the framework of games with a coalition structure.
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3.1 The Myerson levels value
We start by proposing the natural generalization to our setting of the Shapley value,
the Myerson value, and the Shapley levels value.
Definition 3.1. The Myerson levels value, SGL, is the value on GCL, defined for every
(N, v, C,B) ∈ GCL by
SGL(N, v, C,B) = ShL
(
N, vC , B
)
.
That is, the Myerson levels value of a game with graph restricted communication and
levels structure of cooperation, say (N, v, C,B), is the result of a two-stage procedure.
First, the (unrestricted) possibilities of cooperation captured by (N, v) are reduced in
accordance with the communication graph (N,C). This means that if there exist returns
to scale—i.e., the TU-game is strictly superadditive—, only coalitions whose members
are all connected within the graph can obtain their full potential.4 The outcome of
this restriction procedure is (N, vC). Second, the Shapley levels value is applied to
the resulting game with levels structure of cooperation
(
N, vC , B
)
. This implies that
cooperation among agents is further restricted, so that only permutations in which all
agents are ordered in a way that respects the levels structure (N,B) are payoff-relevant.
In the following, we introduce a number of properties that a value for games with
graph restricted communication and levels structure of cooperation may satisfy.
ce A value on GCL, f, satisfies component efficiency if for every (N, v, C,B) ∈ GCL
and every S ∈ N/C, ∑
i∈S
fi (N, v, C,B) = v(S).
fg A value on GCL, f, satisfies fairness in the graph if for every (N, v, C,B) ∈ GCL
and every i, j ∈ U ∈ B1 ∈ B such that {i : j} ∈ C,
fi (N, v, C,B)− fi
(
N, v, C−ij, B
)
= fj (N, v, C,B)− fj
(
N, v, C−ij, B
)
.
4A TU-game (N, v) is strictly superadditive if v(S ∪ T ) > v(S) + v(T ) for ∅ 6= S, T such that
S ∩ T = ∅.
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bc A value on GCL, f, satisfies balanced contributions if for every (N, v, C,B) ∈ GCL
and every i, j ∈ U ∈ B1 ∈ B,
fi (N, v, C,B)− fi
(
N, v, C,B−j
)
= fj (N, v, C,B)− fj
(
N, v, C,B−i
)
.
clg A value on GCL, f, satisfies the communication level game property if for every
(N, v, C,B) ∈ GCL and every U ∈ Br ∈ B,∑
i∈U
fi (N, v, C,B) = fU
(
Br,
(
vC
)r
, CBr , Br
)
.
The four properties above are inspired by similar properties from the literature.
ce and fg were introduced by Myerson (1977) in the framework of games with graph
restricted communication. bc was proposed by Vázquez-Brage et al. (1996) and clg
by Alonso-Meijide et al. (2009), in both cases for games with graph restricted commu-
nication and a coalition structure.
The first property, ce, requires the spoils generated by unrestricted cooperation
be always attainable for coalitions that are maximally connected in the communication
graph, regardless of the restrictions placed by the levels structure. The latter may affect
the payoff to specific players but not the total payoff of a maximal connected coalition.
Accordingly, there is a sense in which ce builds on the idea that “connected markets”
are always efficient. Hence, ce is more a descriptive property of our setting rather than
a normative requirement.
By contrast, fg is a property with a strong flavor of equity: it requires that the
introduction or removal of a communication link between two agents has to affect
both players’ payoff equally. Redistribution tools such as taxes and public spending
could be used to ensure that this condition is fulfilled. Unlike ce, fg does not apply
independently of the restrictions placed by the levels structure, for the two players
considered have to belong to the same administrative unit (i.e., union) at all levels. fg
is silent with regard to changes in the communication structure that affect citizens who
live in different cities, regions or countries.
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Likewise fg, bc applies to any pair of players who belong to the same union at
all levels of the levels structure. For such a pair of players, bc requires that the when
one of the players becomes completely isolated from the administrative structure—as
modelled by the levels structure—, the effect on the other player is always the same (for
that union). Hence, bc equalizes for each citizen—or, more generally, for the minimal
unit in our model, be it citizens or groups of citizens—the value of the current political
structure with respect to the threat of any of her fellow citizens (who are closest to her
in the levels structure) that they will leave the structure. In a sense, bc can be seen as a
stability property for the lowest non-trivial level of the entire administrative structure:
for any two players that belong to the same union, the threat of one against the other
has to be the same.5 Note that bc assumes that changes in the levels structure induce
in turn no changes in the communication graph.
Finally, clg also deals with the stability of the levels structure, keeping the commu-
nication graph fixed. While bc is concerned with changes in the levels structure from a
horizontal perspective (it compares the payoff change of two citizens who belong to the
same union at all levels), clg is concerned with changes in the levels structure from
a vertical perspective. Specifically, the latter property demands that aggregating units
cannot have an effect on the total payoff of the administrative units (i.e., unions) being
aggregated.
It turns out that the four properties just introduced single out SGL.
Theorem 3.1. The Myerson levels value is the only value on GCL that satisfies ce,
fg, bc, and clg. Moreover, the four properties are independent.6
We point out that the result remains valid if ce and fg are only demanded when the
levels structure is trivial. What is more, we could replace this two properties by any set
5In combination with clg, such a notion of stability translates into all other levels of the adminis-
trative structure.
6For the independence of the properties, we weaken ce and require its applicability only to games
where the levels structure is trivial.
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that characterizes the Myerson value (see e.g. Myerson, 1980, and the characterization
therein).
3.2 The Banzhaf levels graph value
Next, we propose one natural generalization to our setting of the Banzhaf value, the
Banzhaf graph value, and the Banzhaf levels value.
Definition 3.2. The Banzhaf Levels graph value, BGL, is the value on GCL, defined
for every (N, v, C,B) ∈ GCL by
BGL(N, v, C,B) = BaL
(
N, vC , B
)
.
The Banzhaf Levels graph value is obtained by a two-stage procedure similar to
the one used to build the Myerson levels value. The main difference is that after the
transformation of the players’ cooperation possibilities set by the communication graph,
which yields a game with levels structure of cooperation, all admissible coalitions are
now assumed to be equally likely. This property is characteristic of the Banzhaf value—
upon which BGL is based— and is in sharp contrast with the assumption that lies at the
foundation of the Shapley value—upon which SGL is based—, namely that all admissible
permutations are equally likely. The differences between the two approaches are further
discussed in Section 4.
In the following, we introduce more properties that a value for games with graph
restricted communication and levels structure of cooperation may satisfy.
gi A value on GCL, f, satisfies graph isolation if for every (N, v, C,B) ∈ GCL and
every {i} ∈ N/C,
fi (N, v, C,B) = v(i).
2-e A value on GCL, f, satisfies 2-efficiency if for every (N, v, C,B) ∈ GCL and every
i, j ∈ U ∈ B1 ∈ B such that {i : j} ∈ C,
fi (N, v, C,B) + fj (N, v, C,B) = fi (N, vij, Cij, B) + fj (N, vij, Cij, B) ,
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where Cij = C−j ∪ {{i : k} : k ∈ N \ i with {k : j} ∈ C} and for every S ⊆ N ,
vij(S) =
v(S ∪ j) if i ∈ Sv(S \ j) if i /∈ S .
nid A value on GCL, f, satisfies neutrality under individual desertion if for every
(N, v, C,B) ∈ GCL and every i, j ∈ U ∈ B1 ∈ B,
fi (N, v, C,B) = fi
(
N, v, C,B−j
)
.
1-clg A value on GCL, f, satisfies the 1-communication level game property if for every
(N, v, C,B) ∈ GCL and every {i} ∈ Br ∈ B,
fi (N, v, C,B) = f{i}
(
Br,
(
vC
)r
, CBr , Br
)
.
These four properties are again inspired by similar properties from the literature.
gi was introduced by Alonso-Meijide and Fiestras-Janeiro (2006) in the framework of
games with graph restricted communication. 2-e was originally proposed by Lehrer
(1988) for TU-games (see also Haller, 1994). The last two properties, nid and 1-clg,
were introduced by Alonso-Meijide et al. (2007) for games with a coalition structure.
Because gi is weaker than ce, it admits a similar interpretation. Specifically, it
requires that regardless of any consideration, a player who is isolated in the graph
cannot establish any cooperation with any other player, and thus her payoff must be
equal to her stand-alone worth. Hence, this property builds on the positive assumption
that connectedness (in the graph) is a necessary condition for cooperation (in the game).
gi also admits a normative interpretation: no player should be allowed to rip off someone
else’s production if she is isolated in the graph. We stress that gi holds irrespective of
the levels structure.
2-e is concerned with the payoff of two players who not only belong together in
all levels of the level structure of cooperation but are also directly connected in the
graph. Specifically, this property requires that if one of these players delegates her role
to another player, their aggregate payoff has to remain the same. Such an internal
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reorganization may, however, have a re-distributive impact in how much each player is
eventually allocated. Note that 2-e assumes both a change in the game and a change in
the graph. A rationale for this simultaneous premise is the following: the fact that one
player delegates her role to other player means that the former has to be able to transfer
to the latter a property right on both the production (i.e., on the potential contributions
of the game where the delegating player is involved, provided that the delegated player
is also involved) and the network (i.e. on all links in which the delegating player is
involved). In particular, if 2-e is satisfied and either transferring the property rights on
production (e.g., by signing a contract) or transferring the links (e.g., when they are
physical, geographically-based networks) is costly, such internal reorganizations should
in principle not take place, and thus we should always observe that all players take an
active role in the negotiations.
nid is stronger than bc. Indeed, while the latter property is a symmetry condition
that equalizes the effect that the departure of one another player has on any other
player who belongs to the same union at all levels, nid requires these changes be zero.
nid thus builds on the normative assumption that the threat of any citizen claiming
to unilaterally deviate from the current administrative structure should be void for the
fellow citizens who belong to the same unions at all levels.
Finally, 1-clg is weaker than clg. Indeed, the former property results from apply-
ing the latter property to singleton unions of any level. In particular, the interpretation
of 1-clg is essentially the same as that of clg.
It turns out that in combination with fg, the four properties just introduced single
out BGL.
Theorem 3.2. The Banzhaf Levels graph value is the only value on GCL that satisfies
gi, fg, 2-e, nid, and 1-clg. Moreover, the five properties are independent.7
We point out that the result remains valid if gi, 2-e, and fg are only demanded
7For the independence of the properties, we weaken gi and require its applicability only to games
where the levels structure is trivial.
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when the levels structure is trivial. What is more, we could replace this two properties
by any set that characterizes the Banzhaf graph value.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we have introduced and characterized two new values for games with
graph restricted communication and levels structure of cooperation. To the best of our
knowledge, such an analysis was absent in the literature despite the fact that it follows
naturally from all previous contributions regarding games with restricted cooperation.
For our results, we have used properties of two kinds. The first kind of property
describe how a value should behave with respect to changes in the communication graph,
and they can be replaced by any set of properties characterizing the corresponding value
on GC (the Myerson value in the case of SGL and the Banzhaf graph value in the case
of BGL). The second type of property, namely bc and clg for the Myerson levels value
(SGL) and nid and 1-clg for the Banzhaf levels graph value (BGL), are parallel in the
following sense: First, bc is a weakening of nid and hence SGL is less restrictive than
BGL regarding the effect of one agent leaving the levels structure on another. Second,
clg is a stronger requirement than 1-clg. Accordingly, SGL could be more reasonable
than BGL in those situations where the stability of the levels structure is high.
Several aspects of our model deserve scrutiny in the future, of which we mention two.
On the one hand, a closer mapping of our model to real data may help us discern whether
it is the Shapley-like or the Banzhaf-like approach, if any, that is more prevalent. On
the other hand, a purely non-cooperative model of public finance that implements our
two values could guide policy-making based on the normative considerations raised by
our paper.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 3.1.
The proof proceeds in three steps. First, we prove that the Myerson levels value
satisfies ce, fg, bc, and clg. Second, we prove that there is at most one value on GCL
satisfying ce, fg, bc, and clg. Third, we prove that the four properties are logically
independent.
Existence
First, we check that SGL satisfies ce. Let (N, v, C,B) ∈ GCL and S ∈ N/C. By
definition of vC , for every i ∈ S and T ⊆ N \ i,
vC(T ∪ i)− vC(T ) = vC((T ∩ S) ∪ i)− vC(T ∩ S). (1)
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Then, ∑
i∈S
SGLi (N, v, C,B) =
1
|Ω(B)|
∑
σ∈Ω(B)
∑
i∈S
[
vC
(
σ−1[i] ∪ i)− vC (σ−1[i])]
=
1
|Ω(B)|
∑
σ∈Ω(B)
∑
i∈S
[
vC
(
(σ−1[i] ∩ S) ∪ i)− vC (σ−1[i] ∩ S)]
=
1
|Ω(B)|
∑
σ∈Ω(B)
vC(S) = v(S),
where the first equality is obtained by switching the order of the summations, the second
equality results from applying Eq. (1), and the last equality follows by definition of
vC and the observation that for every ordering of the agents in S, adding the marginal
contributions of every player to her set of predecessors yields vC(S) − vC(∅) = vC(S).
Indeed, let S = {i1, . . . , is}, with s = |S|, be such that σ−1[ij] < σ−1[il] if and only if
j < l. Then ∑
i∈S
[
vC
(
(σ−1[i] ∩ S) ∪ i)− vC (σ−1[i] ∩ S)]
=
s∑
l=1
[
vC (i1 ∪ . . . ∪ il)− vC (i1 ∪ . . . ∪ il−1)
]
= vC (i1 ∪ . . . ∪ is) .
Second, we check that SGL satisfies fg. Let (N, v, C,B) ∈ GCL and i, j ∈ U ∈ B1 ∈
B be such that {i : j} ∈ C. Define w = vC − vC−ij . Since SGL is additive (see pp
229-230 in Winter, 1989),
SGLi (N, v, C,B)− SGLi
(
N, v, C−ij, B
)
= ShLi (N, v
C , B)− ShLi (N, vC
−ij
, B)
= ShLi (N,w,B). (2)
We show that i and j are symmetric players in (N,w). Indeed, let S ⊆ N \ {i, j}.
Then, because (S ∪ i)/C = (S ∪ i)/C−ij and (S ∪ j)/C = (S ∪ j)/C−ij, it must be that
w(S ∪ i) = w(S ∪ j) = 0.
Next, since i, j ∈ U ∈ B1 ∈ B and ShL satisfies symmetry (see pp 23-24 in Álvarez-
Mozos and Tejada, 2011), ShLi (N,w,B) = Sh
L
j (N,w,B). Finally, observe that in Eq.
21
(2) the roles of i and j can be replaced. Combining the last equality with these two
versions of Eq. (2), we obtain that SGL satisfies fg.
Third, SGL satisfies bc by its definition and the fact that ShL satisfies the level
balanced contributions property (see p 24 in Álvarez-Mozos and Tejada, 2011).
Fourth and last, SGL satisfies clg because for every U ∈ Br ∈ B,∑
i∈U
SGLi (N, v, C,B) =
∑
i∈U
ShLi (N, v
C , B) = ShLU
(
Br, (v
C)r, Br
)
= ShLU
(
Br,
(
(vC)r
)CBr
, Br
)
= SGLU
(
Br, (v
C)r, CBr , Br
)
,
where the first and last equalities are by definition of SGL, the second one is due to the
fact that ShL satisfies the level game property (see p 24 in Álvarez-Mozos and Tejada,
2011), and the third holds from the observation that when the communication graph is
complete, the graph restricted game is the game itself.
Uniqueness
Let f be a value on GCL satisfying the four properties and let (N, v, C,B) ∈ GCL
be a game with k levels. We show uniqueness of f(N, v, C,B) by induction on k.
First, let k = 0, i.e., B = B0. Define fc, a value on GC, by fc(N, v, C) = f(N, v, C,B0)
for every (N, v, C) ∈ GC. Since f satisfies ce and fg, fc satisfies the two properties of
the characterization of Myerson (1977). Then fc = SG, and f(N, v, C,B0) is uniquely
determined. Note that we only use ce for games (with graph restricted communication
and levels structure of cooperation) (N, v, C,B) where B = B0, i.e., where the levels
structure is trivial.
Second, suppose that the payoffs according to f are unique for any game with less
than k levels. Then, let (N, v, C,B) ∈ GCL be a game with k levels, so that we have
B = {B0, . . . , Bk+1}. Let i ∈ U ∈ B1. We show uniqueness of fi(N, v, C,B) by a second
induction on the cardinality of U .
On the one hand, suppose that U = {i}. Then, by clg,
fi(N, v, C,B) = fU
(
B1, (v
C)1, CB1 , Br
)
.
22
Note that
(
B1, (v
C)1, CB1 , Br
)
is a game with k − 1 levels. Then, the payoff above is
unique by the first induction hypothesis. On the other hand, suppose that the payoff
according to f is unique for any player that belongs to a union of the first level with a
cardinality smaller than u > 1, and let i ∈ U ∈ B1 ∈ B be such that |U | = u. Take
j ∈ U \ i. By bc,
fi(N, v, C,B)− fj(N, v, C,B) = fi(N, v, C,B−j)− fj(N, v, C,B−i). (3)
Note that the payoffs in the right-hand side of the above equation are unique by the
second induction hypothesis. Adding up Eq. (3) for every j ∈ U \ i, we obtain that
u · fi(N, v, C,B)−
∑
j∈U
fj(N, v, C,B) (4)
is uniquely determined. Finally, by clg,∑
j∈U
fj(N, v, C,B) = f[U ]
(
B1, (v
C)1, CB1 , Br
)
,
which is also unique by the first induction hypothesis. Together with Eq. (4), this fact
concludes this step of the proof.
Logical independence
It only remains to check that the four properties are independent.
(i) Let f be the value on GCL defined for every (N, v, C,B) ∈ GCL and i ∈ N by
fi(N, v, C,B) = 0.
Then, f satisfies fg, bc, and clg but not ce.
(ii) Let f be the value on GCL defined for every (N, v, C,B) ∈ GCL as follows: If
N = {i, j} and C = CN , then
fi(N, v, C,B) =
3
4
(v(N)− v(j)) + 1
4
v(i)
fj(N, v, C,B) =
1
4
(v(N)− v(i)) + 3
4
v(j)
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Otherwise, f(N, v, C,B) = SGL(N, v, C,B).8
Then, f satisfies ce, bc, and clg but not fg.
(iii) Let f be the value on GCL defined for every (N, v, C,B) ∈ GCL by f(N, v, C,B) =
SGL(N, v, C,B0).
Then, f satisfies ce, fg, and bc, but not clg.
(iv) Let f be the value on GCL defined for every (N, v, C,B) ∈ GCL and i ∈ N by
fi(N, v, C,B) =
SGLU
(
B1, (v
C)1, CB1 , B1
)
|U | , where i ∈ U ∈ B1.
Then, f satisfies ce (for B0), fg, and clg, but not bc.

Proof of Theorem 3.2.
The proof proceeds in three steps. First, we prove that the Banzhaf levels graph
value satisfies gi, fg, 2-e, nid, and 1-clg. Second, we prove that there is at most one
value on GCL satisfying gi, fg, 2-e, nid, and 1-clg. Third, we prove that the five
properties are logically independent.
Existence
First, we check that BGL satisfies gi. Let (N, v, C,B) ∈ GCL be such that {i} ∈
N/C. Then, by definition of the graph restricted game, for every S ⊆ N \ i, it holds
that vC(S ∪ i) − vC(S) = v(i). Accordingly, i is a dummy player in (N, vC) and gi
then follows from the fact that BaL satisfies the dummy player property (see pp 23-25
in Álvarez-Mozos and Tejada, 2011).
Second, we check that BGL satisfies 2-e. Let (N, v, C,B) ∈ GCL and i, j ∈ U ∈
B1 ∈ B be such that {i : j} ∈ C. By definition of P (i, B), P (i, B)\{j} = P (j, B)\{i}.
Then, define P (ij, B) = P (i, B) \ {j} = {T1, . . . , Tmij} and Mij = {1, . . . ,mij}, and
8 Here we assume that i and j can never be the label of any player that results from the merging
of “core” players of the lowest level of the levels structure considered in clg.
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note that mij = mi − 1. On the one hand,
BGLi (N, v, C,B) + BG
L
j (N, v, C,B) = Ba
L
i
(
N, vC , B
)
+ BaLj
(
N, vC , B
)
=
∑
R⊆Mij
1
2mi
[
vC(TR ∪ i)− vC(TR) + vC(TR ∪ j ∪ i)− vC(TR ∪ j)
]
+
∑
R⊆Mij
1
2mi
[
vC(TR ∪ j)− vC(TR) + vC(TR ∪ i ∪ j)− vC(TR ∪ i)
]
=
∑
R⊆Mij
1
2mi−1
[
vC(TR ∪ j ∪ i)− vC(TR)
]
.
On the other hand,
BGLi (N, vij, Cij, B) = Ba
L
i
(
N, (vij)
Cij , B
)
=
∑
R⊆Mi
1
2mi
[
(vij)
Cij(TR ∪ i)− (vij)Cij(TR)
]
=
∑
R⊆Mij
1
2mi
[
(vij)
Cij(TR ∪ i)− (vij)Cij(TR) + (vij)Cij(TR ∪ j ∪ i)− (vij)Cij(TR ∪ j)
]
=
∑
R⊆Mij
1
2mi−1
[
vC(TR ∪ j ∪ i)− vC(TR)
]
.
where the last equality follows from the following four observations:
(vij)
Cij(TR ∪ i) =
∑
S∈(TR∪i)/Cij
vij(S) =
∑
S∈(TR∪i)/Cij
vij(S \ j)
=
∑
S∈(TR∪i∪j)/C
vij(S \ j) =
∑
S∈(TR∪i∪j)/C
v(S) = vC(TR ∪ i ∪ j),
(vij)
Cij(TR) =
∑
S∈TR/C
vij(S) =
∑
S∈TR/C
v(S) = vC(TR),
(vij)
Cij(TR ∪ i ∪ j) =
∑
S∈(TR∪i∪j)/Cij
vij(S) = vij(j) +
∑
S∈(TR∪i∪j)/C
vij(S \ j)
=
∑
S∈(TR∪i∪j)/C
v(S) = vC(TR ∪ i ∪ j),
(vij)
Cij(TR ∪ j) =
∑
S∈(TR∪j)/Cij
vij(S) = vij(j) +
∑
S∈TR/C
vij(S)
=
∑
S∈TR/C
v(S) = vC(TR).
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Taking into account that j is isolated in Cij, that BGL satisfies gi and that vij({j}) = 0,
it then follows that BGL satisfies 2-e.
Third, to verify that BGL satisfies fg, we can replicate the argument in the proof of
Theorem 3.1. Indeed, note that BaL satisfies additivity and symmetry (see pp 24-25 in
Álvarez-Mozos and Tejada, 2011).
Fourth, BGL satisfies nid by definition and by the fact that BaL satisfies the level
neutrality under individual desertion property (see pp 24-25 in Álvarez-Mozos and
Tejada, 2011).
Fifth and last, to verify that BGL satisfies 1-clg, we can replicate the argument in
the proof of Theorem 3.1, because BaL satisfies the singleton level game property (see
pp 24-25 in Álvarez-Mozos and Tejada, 2011).
Uniqueness
Let f be a value on GCL satisfying the five properties and (N, v, C,B) ∈ GCL be a
game with k levels. We show the uniqueness of f(N, v, C,B) by induction on k.
First, let k = 0, i.e., B = B0. We show the uniqueness of f(N, v, C,B0) by induction
on the number of links |C|. In the case |C| = 0, every i ∈ N is isolated in C, and
hence fi(N, v, C,B0) = v(i) follows from gi. Next, suppose that payoffs are unique for
any game with a trivial levels structure and less than c > 0 links, and let (N, v, C,B0)
be a game with c links. Take i ∈ N . If i is isolated in the graph, uniqueness follows
again from gi. Otherwise, i.e. if i is not isolated in the graph, let j ∈ N be such that
{i : j} ∈ C. On the one hand, by fg
fi
(
N, v, C,B0
)− fj (N, v, C,B0) = fi (N, v, C−ij, B0)− fj (N, v, C−ij, B0) . (5)
On the other hand, by 2-e
fi
(
N, v, C,B0
)
+ fj
(
N, v, C,B0
)
= fi
(
N, v, Cij, B0
)
+ fj
(
N, v, Cij, B0
)
. (6)
By definition, both modified communication graphs above, namely C−ij and Cij, have
less than c links. Then, the payoffs in the right-hand side of Eqs. (5) and (6) are uniquely
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determined by the second induction hypothesis. Consequently, the payoffs in the left-
hand side are also determined, thereby implying the uniqueness of fi
(
N, v, C,B0
)
and
fj
(
N, v, C,B0
)
—and hence that of f(N, v, C,B0). Note that uniqueness follows because
Eqs. (5) and (6) define a determinate compatible system of equations in the two
unknowns fi
(
N, v, C,B0
)
and fj
(
N, v, C,B0
)
.
Second, suppose that the payoffs according to f are unique for any game with
less than k > 0 levels. Let (N, v, C,B) ∈ GCL be a game with k levels, i.e., B =
{B0, . . . , Bk+1}. Take i ∈ U ∈ B1. We show the uniqueness of fi(N, v, C,B) by a sec-
ond induction on the cardinality of U . On the one hand, suppose that U = {i}. Then,
by 1-clg
fi(N, v, C,B) = f[U ]
(
[B1], (v
C)1, C [B1], Br
)
.
Note that
(
[B1], (v
C)1, C [B1], Br
)
is a game with k− 1 levels. Then, the payoff above is
unique by the first induction hypothesis. On the other hand, suppose that the payoff
according to f is unique for any player that belongs to a union of the first level with a
cardinality smaller than u > 1 and let i ∈ U ∈ B1 be such that |U | = u. Take j ∈ U \ i.
Then, by nid
fi(N, v, C,B) = fi(N, v, C,B
−j).
The payoff fi(N, v, C,B−j) is unique by the second induction hypothesis, which con-
cludes this step of the proof.
Logical independence
It only remains to check that the five properties are independent.
(i) Let f be the value on GCL defined for every (N, v, C,B) ∈ GCL and i ∈ N by
fi(N, v, C,B) = 0.
Then, f satisfies fg, 2-e, nid, and 1-clg but not gi.
(ii) Let f be the value on GCL defined for every (N, v, C,B) ∈ GCL as follows: If
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N = {i, j} and C = CN , then
fi(N, v, C,B) =
3
4
(v(N)− v(j)) + 1
4
v(i)
fj(N, v, C,B) =
1
4
(v(N)− v(i)) + 3
4
v(j)
Otherwise, f(N, v, C,B) = BGL(N, v, C,B).
Then, f satisfies gi, 2-e, nid, and 1-clg9 but not fg.
(iii) Let f be the value on GCL defined for every (N, v, C,B) ∈ GCL and i ∈ N by
fi(N, v, C,B) =
∑
R⊆Mi
|R|!(mi − |R| − 1)!
mi!
[
vC(TR ∪ i)− vC(TR)
]
.
Then, f satisfies gi, fg, nid and 1-clg, but not 2-e.
(iv) Let f be the value on GCL defined for every (N, v, C,B) ∈ GCL by f(N, v, C,B) =
BGL(N, v, C,B0).
Then, f satisfies gi, fg, 2-e, and nid but not 1-clg.
(v) Let f be the value on GCL defined for every (N, v, C,B) ∈ GCL and i ∈ N by
fi(N, v, C,B) =
BGLU
(
B1, (v
C)1, CB1 , B1
)
|U | , where i ∈ U ∈ B1.
Then, f satisfies gi (for B0), fg, 2-e, and 1-clg but not nid.

9The same remark as in Footnote 8 applies here.
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